DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC)

Subcommittee on Export Control (EXCON)

Subcommittee on Exchanges (COMEX)

TTIC-C-011-88 13 January 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: TTIC Members

FROM:

Executive Secretary

SUBJECT:

Evaluation of Soviet S&T Proposals

As you requested at the TTIC meeting which was held on 12 January, I am forwarding a copy of the COMEX evaluation of 112 Soviet S&T proposals under the US-USSR Basic Sciences Agreement. The high quality of this report is dependent largely on solid inputs provided by the members - in this case, primarily from COMEX members.

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Attachments

Upon Removal of Attachment Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

(TTIC)

Subcommittee on Export Control (EXCON)

Subcommittee on Exchanges (COMEX)

EC-562-87 15 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Thomas B. Robertson

Office of Soviet Union Affairs

Department of State

FROM:

Executive Secretary, COMEX

SUBJECT:


Soviet Proposals for General Scientific Cooperation

OR 169-87

REFERENCE:

EC-250-87

- 1. Proposed Cooperation. During discussions in Moscow early in October, the Soviets provided a list of 95 topics for cooperation (including 22 sub-topics under five of those, for a total of 112 separate proposals) in 16 scientific or technological categories. They run the gamut from purely theoretical investigations in physics and mathematics to the development of specific techniques and applications in welding and corrosion inhibition. The Soviets have put forward these suggestions for possible inclusion in a prospective US-Soviet agreement on basic science.
- 2. Recommended Action. TTIC's Subcommittee on Exchanges (COMEX) recommends no further consideration of 21 of the proposed topics, approval of 32 for immediate further discussion, and restrictions on consideration of the remaining 42. The topics are listed according to this classification in paragraph 4 below; COMEX's detailed reactions are laid out, topic by topic, in the Appendix.
- a. COMEX had earlier (see reference) recommended wholesale disapproval of the Soviets' originally proposed categories dealing with advanced materials, technologies based on new physical principles, corrosion, membranes, artificial intelligence, and automation. The Soviets, nevertheless, have again proposed the first four categories as major areas of cooperation, with the last two resurfacing as topics under one or more other categories—and it appears that the US has at least implicitly agreed to consider them. Accordingly, and despite its persisting doubts about the advisability of conceding these categories to the Soviets as fit subjects for major cooperative programs, COMEX has conducted a "zero-based" review of all the categories and subordinate topics from the perspective of potential



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US technological loss. Throughout, no effort is made to use the difference between basic and applied science as a general criterion for judgment, as the distinction does not seem to be operative in any definable way in discussions already begun with the Soviets.

b. In planning the next stage of exchanges with the Soviets on possible scientific cooperation, it now appears critical to define attainable objectives and to focus upon practicable ways of achieving them. The administration, as such, of scientific and technical cooperation is outside COMEX's purview, strictly speaking. However, the conclusion appears inescapable, for example, that continued expansion of the number and scope of proposals under consideration can only bode ill for the prospects of effective implementation of any agreement. The groundwork should be laid now for administrative structures and coordinating procedures that will ensure the reliability of controls to prevent the inadvertent loss of technology to a potential adversary.

c. One possibility that may deserve attention as a way to enhance the coherence of plans for cooperation would involve some shifting of topics. Proposals that appear usable or acceptable from the US viewpoint might be moved from the more heavily technological Soviet categories and placed under the US's scientific headings—or under the more clearly scientific Soviet categories. Some specific suggestions along these lines are incorporated at appropriate places in the Appendix.

- 3. General Assessment. The general motivation underlying the Soviet proposals seems fairly clear.
- a. As a recent CIA analysis noted, Soviet priorities as reflected in their suggestions can be listed in the following order:
 - -- To obtain technological support for economic modernization;
 - -- To gain the means of enhancing Soviet military capabilities;
 - -- To contribute to the advancement of science.

This hierarchy of interests, from greatest to least, is consistent with the comments contributed by analysts who participated in the COMEX review, though those comments seemed to imply that defense industrial interests are probably paramount in the drive for economic modernization.

b. The explicit or implicit role of MNTKS (interbranch scientific and technical complexes) in the Soviet proposals further confirms Soviet intentions. These new, nation-wide organizations are dedicated to the development of technology in all its phases, from conception through research and engineering to full-scale industrial implementation.

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Fundamental scientific research is of interest to these entities only as a necessary precursor to the development of practical technology. Certain of	
the MNTKs that would play a dominant role if the Soviet suggestions were	
implemented as proposed also have well-established ties to military research and defense production activities.	25X1
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4. Classification of Assessed Proposals. The Soviet proposals are summarized below in three separate lists according to the COMEX	
recommendations for denial, approval, or approval with restrictions. The	
Appendix contains a full presentation of COMEX's reactions.	25 X 1
a. Unacceptable risks of technological loss are associated with	
the following areas and projects, which should be denied any further consideration for discussion with the Soviets:	
consideration for discussion with the Soviets:	25X1
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